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THESIS

SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS
FINLANDIZATION OR FRATERNIZATION?

by

Paul Henry Nelson

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

J. Valenta

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SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS
FINLANDIZATION OR FRATERNIZATION

by

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Captain, United States Army
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requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

What difference could a country like Finland make in this world dominated as it is by the superpowers? Of what significance is the role of the least populated of the Scandinavian countries which claims to be neutral? Isn't Finland and its relation with the Soviet Union the personification of the term Finlandization?

The misconceptions surrounding these and other questions concerning the Finns and their way of coexisting with the Soviets provided the author's motives in choosing this thesis: the people of Finland are not a subjugated lot to be classified as just another of the Soviet satellites.

It is the purpose of this thesis to determine the potential of Finland's foreign policy as a model for other small countries to pursue in dealing with a superpower such as the Soviet Union. Russo-Finnish relations have been the subject of a wide range of judgements, from condemnation and scorn to admiration and envy. This thesis will examine Finland's ability to maintain harmony with the Soviet Union, which is remarkable; particularly, at a time when other Scandinavian countries' relations with the Soviets are deteriorating.

Relations between the Finns and the Soviets are of a unique nature and warrant close examination. Toward this end a brief historical summary is provided in Chapter II with the focus of attention being the Winter War. Having provided this




Figure 1: Map of the Nordic Region

basis of perspective, the role of Finland in Scandinavia and the significance of her strategic position with respect to the neighboring Soviet stronghold in the Kola Peninsula is addressed in Chapter III.

The primary focus of this thesis is examined in Chapter IV: Finlandization. What it means from both a Finnish and a Soviet perspective is of great importance for viewing the relationship of these two countries. Having defined these views, Chapter V deals with the Communists' role in Finland and the degree of Soviet control that is exercised over the Finns.

Finland's primary contribution to the subject of world arms control is summarized in Chapter VI. It is of diminished significance in this era of fading detente perhaps, but still enjoys considerable attention within Scandinavian circles.

The final chapter extracts several suggested answers to questions about the nature of Soviet-Finnish relations as well as the role of Finland in world affairs. These conclusions constitute the measure of the validity of this thesis. Whether or not the reader agrees with these conclusions, it is hoped that at the very least this thesis will provoke a new perspective toward the Finnish people and their importance in international affairs.

During the course of this research a visit to Finland provided the opportunity to interview individuals from a diverse sector of Finnish society. In order that the reader might better understand the perspectives of the author, it

seems appropriate to briefly introduce some of these people.

In response to a request for assistance in coordinating this trip, the Finnish Ambassador to the United States, Jaakko Iloniemi, cabled the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press section, Jaakko Bergqvist, who was most congenial and receptive to any and all questions and requests. The majority of the coordination of interviews, however, was managed by the office of Karl Möttölä, the editor-in-chief of the Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy published by the Institute of International Affairs. After an initial session with Mr. Möttölä, he channeled his interpretations of this thesis' purpose into the most appropriate sources of information. These sources ranged from those individuals mentioned below to a well-stocked library, access to which was provided between interviews. This was valuable both to make final preparations for interviews and to pursue follow-up questions on unresolved issues.

The significance of the accuracy and in-depth understanding of Mr. Möttölä's perceptions of the questions put forth was very important. His thorough grasp of the issues addressed in this thesis proved to be of great value. Pinpointing with precise accuracy the most reliable as well as comprehensive sources of information, Mr. Möttölä and his staff insured an unbiased and complete perspective of the issues was provided in a minimal amount of time.

Professor Apunen, head of the political science department at Tampere University was the most outspoken of those interviewed. His party affiliation with the social democrats often puts him at odds with President Kekkonen's views and his sometimes radical positions were a constant source of contrast to the staid regurgitations of the party line presented by such men as the Chief of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Törnudd. The conservative and reserved remarks of Mr. Törnudd were tightly controlled responses which adhered strictly to official policy.

Similar replies to questions were received from the military sector, represented by Dr. Kalevi Ruhala and Dr. Pauli Järvenpää of the Institute of Military Science, Helsinki.

Of a more moderate nature were the sessions with Mr. Kivinen, editor of the foreign affairs section of Finland's leading daily, Helsingin Sonomat (circulation 400,000), who had just returned from a trip to Moscow. Along these same lines, the conversations with Mr. Jaakko Bergqvist were similarly rewarding as candid views were readily forthcoming.

II. HISTORY AND THE WINTER WAR

Finland enjoys a unique relationship with the Soviet Union, which is to a large degree, based on the historical precedent that has been set. After over 650 years in Swedish union, Finland spent just over a century (1809-1917) as a Russian Duchy. Prior to the nineteenth century tremendous Scandinavian influence was inculcated in the Finns. Equally important was the spirit of independence which pervaded every action of the Finns both individually and as a nation. This independence grew out of their livelihood of forestry which remains the primary industry today. As a Finnish author put it: "The severity of life in the north and the ever present forest moulded the Finnish character. In the backwoods a man must rely on himself, on his own strength and his own inventiveness."¹ The significance of this heritage cannot be discounted.

By becoming allied with Sweden, Finland also precluded invasion by conquering hoards and established a legacy of private ownership of land. The loose control exercised by Sweden left the Finns to largely determine their own fate and further cultivated the democratic ideals which have persisted in Finnish government.

As Swedish power faded in the eighteenth century, Finland became increasingly aware of the persistent threat from the east. The Swedes, led by King Karl XII, were decisively

defeated after overextending themselves into Russia and the Tsar's armies overran Finland. This prompted a natural shift in Finnish posture as her very survival was threatened. The occupation of Finland by the Russians (1713-1721) left a bitter taste in the Finns' mouths. The hate was rekindled less than a century later as Russia once again occupied Finland in conjunction with the establishment of the Continental Blockade to fend off Napoleon (1808-9).

The end result of this last occupation was that Finland was declared an autonomous Grand Duchy. In spite of this Russian intervention, however, the Finns were able to preserve their way of life and continued to run their government separate from that of Russia. Other evidence of independence was manifested by the continuation of the constitution which had its origins in the Swedish period. Additionally, the levels of taxation were not increased and the Finns were not conscripted for service under the Tsar.

This was the beginning of the unique relationship the Finns have with their neighbor to the east. Based on a combination of factors: their historical background, geographic position, religion, language and livelihood, the Finns developed as a peaceful neighbor with a distinct autonomous nature. The people of Finland were thoroughly capable of coexisting in spite of not sharing much of the Russian experience. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the fact that the land of Finland was never tilled by serfs,

but rather by land-owning peasants. The sharp contrast in style of government also emphasizes the disparity in national life styles between the Russians and the Finns.

What emerged from this nineteenth century experience with the Russians is an acceptance of the past Swedish rule, tolerance of the imposed Russian presence and an overall quest on the part of the Finnish people to be themselves.

This notion is perhaps best expressed in the motto of mid-nineteenth century Finland: "'We are no longer Swedes, we cannot become Russians, let us then be Finns.'"² Just as nationalism dominated the political scene throughout Europe in the last half of the nineteenth century, so too did it see its rise in Finland. Tsar Alexander II was exceedingly tolerant of the nationalist reforms in Finland, further increasing the autonomy of his Grand Duchy. Ethnic factions within Finland split the populace along language lines as Swedish speaking citizens had little tolerance for what they considered the inferior Finnish tongue spoken by ever-increasing numbers. Fortunately for Finland, as so often happens, the common enemy - Russian oppression - kept the two factions together. The Finns felt remote indeed from the intricate diplomatic maneuverings of Bismarck. The effects, however, of mounting European tensions were felt as Russia's insecurity drove her to extreme measures to fend off Prussian imperialism. The bonds of all Finns became tighter as Nicholas II pursued his policy of Russification.

The seeds of rebellion were planted as the Finns started down the road to independence.

Finland continued to follow the lead of European movements, though being spared the radical extremes by virtue of the more relaxed assimilation. The continuity which had been evident throughout Finnish history continued in her drive towards independence. Her bureaucracy had been long established at both the local and federal level. Thus Finland had many of the makings of an independent state even before the revolution.

Finland achieved her independence in 1917, the same year the Soviet Union emerged out of the tattered remains of Russia. Wracked by the punishing blows of World War I, Finland's neighbor to the east lacked both the means and the inclination to prevent her former Grand Duchy from going her own way. The Russification program that the Tsar had tried to impose had served to accomplish quite the opposite effect of its objectives, the Finns having been united in opposition to it. Certainly, a sufficient concentration of force and effort could have subdued and forced the absorption of the Finnish people into the Russian fold, however, an adequate effort was not forthcoming. Consequently, following the successful coup in Petrograd and Lenin's accession as the new leader of Russia, Finland's independence was recognized by Russia on 4 January 1918.

In search of a head of state, the Finns turned to the few military leaders who had gained experience during World War I, and Mannerheim became the "father of Finland."

Throughout the inter-war period, Finland sought to maintain amiable relations with the new Soviet state while at the same time supporting the drive for independence and cooperation of the Baltic states. In spite of Finland's attempts to remain neutral, the looming threat that Hitler posed to the Soviet Union eventually would initiate a tragic series of events that culminated in a total realignment of world power.

In 1939 began what would become the single most significant event in the entire history of relations between Finland and Russia - the Winter War. To emphasize the importance of this conflict, the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in November of 1939 and the continued bargaining throughout the struggle will be examined. The primary means of analysis will be Allison's model of bureaucratic politics.³

In November 1939 when the Soviets attacked Finland, everyone except the Finns anticipated the quick capitulation which had marked the rendering of fraternal assistance to the Baltic States. The Soviets were first among those who had deluded themselves into visions of encountering a submissive populace and quickly yielding military resistance. Before a cease fire brought this opening scene of World War II to a close, 200,000 Soviet soldiers lay dead and frozen on the

Karelian frontiers.⁴ This is contrasted with the Finns losses of roughly 25,000 killed.⁵ Putting these figures in perspective with respect to the population to make them more meaningful, consider that the Finns had a population of 3.89 million in 1939 of which approximately 200,000 were in the military service.⁶ The Soviet Union had a force of 1.2 million that they brought to bear on this venture.⁷ The entire Soviet military force of approximately 2.6 million in 1939⁸ was drawn from a population of roughly 160 million.⁹ So while the Finns lost about 12% of their force, the Soviets incurred an 8% casualty rate in losing as many men as the total Finnish army numbered. In addition to this immediate unanticipated cost in manpower, the Soviets and the communist movement which they saw themselves heading, had lost considerable prestige.

"So severely had Soviet military reputations been mauled in the earlier stages of the war that the final episodes took on a character of revenge for and restitution of a badly tarnished honour."¹⁰ Perhaps this display of ineptness was extensive enough to convince Hitler that the road to Moscow was not so formidable after all.

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of these events and the diplomacy which caused them, employing Allison's model of bureaucratic politics.¹¹ Having briefly established the historical background, the questions suggested by Allison in his model will be addressed. It is

incumbent upon this author to note that, as is usually the case in dealing with matters involving the closed society of the Soviet Union, painfully little is available about decision-making in the Kremlin. Thus, the Finnish perspective is difficult to refute as authoritative, and for purposes of this analysis, no attempt will be made to identify any bias. The paucity of Soviet material on this subject is particularly acute as the Soviets were loath to reveal the degree of their ineptness to the extent that they have even forbidden the release of all Finnish records on the war until 1980.

Just as Allison labeled the dominant feature of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet Union as a continuous struggle for power in analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, so too must Stalin's regime be assessed for our purposes here. The inevitable consequence of this fact took on a somewhat different twist in 1939, however, as the power struggle was within the military as well as in the Kremlin. Hence, not only did the policy issues become involved with the power play, but with the tactics and strategy on the battlefield as well.

Before examining the Winter War itself, a brief overview of Allison's model and the questions it points us to is useful. This will better enable us to determine why the decision to initiate hostilities with the Finns was made by the Kremlin. This approach will require identification of the

primary actors, analyze what coalitions and bargains they struck, what compromises were made and at the same time, "convey some feel for the confusion."¹² Finally, the cost/benefit relationship will be examined to see whether an overall advantageous course of action was followed.

The Russians deluded themselves into anticipating an easy victory. A combination of factors, including belief in their own propaganda, caused this misconception. The result was that after a month of fighting, the Soviet offensive had ground to a halt and the incompetence of the Soviet military was on display. World sentiment anxiously followed the valiant Finns as they stood up to the ominous power of the Soviet Union, symbolic of a democracy defending itself against totalitarian imperialism. Unfortunately, the Finns attained only marginal success in translating this sympathy into concrete support, and was eventually doomed to accept the inevitable defeat. The Soviet reaction to the embarrassment was to blame the Finns for "mobilizing first and sending a delegation afterwards"¹³ and to blame the western democracies in general for causing "mad hysteria to be whipped up against the Soviet Union all over the world."¹⁴

The Kremlin's approach to the problem was tried and proven with unhesitating success in the cases of the Baltic States. Stalin and Molotov had become overconfident and probably never anticipated the unfriendly reception that the Red Army received.

Action channels became secondary considerations as the level of intensity in negotiations quickly rose to limit the number of actors to a very few central players. Soviet decision making was thoroughly dominated by Molotov and Stalin, with the Finns focal point being Paasikivi and to some extent, Tanner. Other lesser roles were played by the Swedes' Prime Minister Hanssen, Daladier of France, German Minister Blücher and United States Secretary of State Hull. The peripheral nature of the roles played by characters not directly associated with the confrontation between Finland and the USSR is particularly emphasized and their involvement for purposes of this paper are accordingly limited.

This is contrary to the case made for consensus building by Professor Valenta in his recently published book on the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia wherein he uses the example of Stalin conferring with three men (Kuusinen, Zhdanov, and Tributs) to build support for his case.¹⁵ Both Mannerheim in his memoirs¹⁶ and Tanner in his book on the Winter War¹⁷ state that they are convinced that Stalin's mind was made up before negotiations began. Therefore, what may have taken on the color of consensus building may in reality have only been an attempt to patronize these three. It could also have been a form of consensus building after the fact.

Narrowing the cast to the central figures of Stalin, Molotov and Paasikivi will provide a relatively thorough

analysis and will facilitate a demonstration of the usefulness of the following questions in analyzing the events.

The question of how past stances (or historical precedent) and personality affect the central players is of particular significance in assessing the negotiations. While Paasikivi and the state he represented were obviously operating from a position of weakness with respect to the relative strength of Russia, the historical experience of the Finns in their long association with their neighbors to the east undoubtedly had considerable impact.

Paasikivi was ideally suited for the task of negotiating with the Kremlin. The whole mood of the talks was set initially at an informal level as Paasikivi's linguistic skills precluded the need for interpreters.¹⁸ In the more relaxed atmosphere that ensued, the experienced statesman worked methodically to enhance his position.

The personalities of Stalin and Molotov are not dissimilar, particularly with respect to their manner of dealing with small countries. The fact that it was deemed a concession on the part of this duo to discuss the issues gives a clear indication of their condescending nature as statesmen. The Finns were aware of the ruthlessness with which Stalin had dealt with all the potential enemies, both real and imagined. Still, Paasikivi fought to preserve the self-respect of his people and himself. Criticized for a soft line approach by Finnish liberals, he was essentially a victim of

the parameters established by Parliament. Regardless, Molotov and Stalin left little room for maneuver.

The source of the Soviet position can logically be traced to the terms of the non-aggression pact with Germany. The Russians had regarded Finland as a buffer state since it had become a Grand Duchy in 1809.¹⁹ The signature of the Russian-German Pact on 23 August 1939 in Moscow provided not only for abstention by either party from attack on the other and for neutrality by either party if one were attacked by a third party, but also had been preceded by several pointed overtures. In Hitler's Reichstag speech of 28 April 1939 he made a specific offer of bilateral non-aggression pacts with the Scandinavian and Baltic States which Denmark, Latvia and Estonia accepted.²⁰

The dividing up of the border states by Germany and Russia in conjunction with the signing of the non-aggression pact left little doubt as to the fate of the lesser powers. Finland was included with the Baltic States in the Soviet spoils and it is a logical extension of the progressive absorption of these states that leads one quickly to the conclusion that the fate of Finland was sealed before negotiations prior to the Winter War commenced. As V. Tanner remarked, "While the negotiations were underway, the Soviet demands tended to increase and did not by any means come closer to the Finnish position as might properly have been expected."²¹ His observation was that the "Soviet Union was acting in

conformity with a plan which had been adopted in advance."²² The Soviets' collaboration with the Germans indicated Russian expectations of Finnish acceptance. It appears that the decision to liberate Finland had been made before Paasikivi made his first trip to Moscow, and in Stalin's and Molotov's eyes it was only a question of when and at what price.

As is usually the case with crisis situations, a deadline was faced which further aggravated the Soviets' efforts to achieve domination. Unfortunately for the Russians, they did not recognize soon enough nor did they accord sufficient respect to the dominating control that the onset of winter would impose on the Red Army's invasion. Finland, on the other hand, knew the advantages its winter warfare trained troops would gain and the potential for providing enough delay for the intervention on their behalf by the allied forces. The aid was never forthcoming, but the winter dealt a crippling blow to the Soviet forces, combining with the tenacity of the Finns' defense of their homeland to make a lasting impression on world opinion.

In addressing where foul-ups are most likely, the horrendous boggling of the assault by the Russian military leaders cannot be attributed entirely to their incompetence. Rather it was a combination of factors. Of great significance was the existence of a power struggle within the military which severely distracted from a coordinated effort in both the

planning and the executing of the invasion. Secondly, there was the intangible factor of motivation on the part of both armies; the Finns determinedly defending their homeland, and the aggressors being devastated on a foreign frontier. Nor can the practical consideration of this being the first combat the Red Army engaged in since the Civil War be discounted.

In addition, the Soviets went to Finland with an army which had lost most of its leaders to Stalin's purges. The Red Army was ill-equipped for winter warfare, since they felt there would be no problem conquering the Finns before the onset of winter. This linked directly to the role that the Soviets' overconfident nature played. Thoroughly convinced that they would be welcomed as liberators, the Soviets marched into Finland poorly prepared to fight. Many previous ills of the Red Army plagued commanders in fighting the Finns. Combined arms operations quickly ran amuck as the parochial interest affiliated with Soviet defensive doctrine persisted. A host of tactical and logistical foul-ups served to hinder Soviet offensive operations as well.

Finally, there was the disastrous factor already discussed in its role as a deadline: winter.

An OSS report of 1944 vintage sums up the temperament and military qualities of the Finns as follows:

In temperament, the Finns are usually slow, stubborn, deliberate and have considerable staying power. Military qualities were shown by the war in 1939-1940 to be of a high order. Foreign observers no less than Finnish enthusiasts agree that the Finn is a tough,

intelligent soldier. He could stand the rigors of exacting fighting, worked well in groups and disclosed marked capacity for independent initiative and action.²³

A praiseworthy assessment which overlooks one critical ingredient: freedom-loving.

The risks of intervention were great for the Soviets. The unknown quantities of what the allied response would be and the essentially untested, inexperienced, ill-equipped Red Army should have tempered the enthusiasm for intervention. If it is true "that Soviet perceptions of the risks involved in the use of military force are one of the main factors influencing decision making,"²⁴ then the Kremlin was certainly poorly acquainted with the realities of the situation. The brutal results of the Winter War alone testify to how unprepared the Red Army really was.

The final decision may have been influenced significantly by the "exigencies of bureaucratic affiliation and by the ability of some players to maneuver rivals, and not solely by the merits of the situation or the arguments put forward by individual decision makers."²⁵ The arguments against the consensus building thesis have already been made, however, and perhaps the real reason is much more straight forward: the die had been cast with the signing of the German-Russian non-aggression pact.

In summary, this analysis shows the cost-benefit relationship of the Winter War. The Soviets came out the losers in three respects. The most detrimental effect was loss of

world prestige as a consequence of having appeared vulnerable. Secondly, there was the tremendous cost in lives already cited. Last, and most significant for the purposes of this analysis, the Soviet Union lost a measure of superiority in dealing with the Finns.

III. SCANDINAVIA AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The security policy of NATO's northern flank has increased significantly in relative importance as a consequence of developments in weapons' technology. In the shift of emphasis in the superpowers' nuclear weaponry from land-based to submarine-launched missiles, securing bases for these vessels has made geography a basic strategic factor.¹ The significance of the Soviet threat in this region was clearly stated by former NATO commander, General Haig, in a 21 March 1978 news conference in which he asserted that "the more likely challenges that we will be faced with are on the flanks"² not in the central region of Europe.

The importance of the Kola Peninsula as the harbor of Russia's northern flank forces has inserted a new factor into NATO's relationship with the Soviet Union. The strategic importance of this area is being dealt with by actors outside the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact as well. It is the purpose of this chapter to answer the question of what impact this Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula is having on the direction and nature of Finnish foreign policy and what impact this could have on the future of Soviet foreign policy.

The approach that will be taken in formulating a response to these questions will be to provide, by way of introduction the strategic significance of the Kola Peninsula, Finland's

military posture and finally a synopsis of Finnish-Soviet relations, reiterating some of the points made previously in Chapter II.

After this introduction, the relationship of the Scandinavian balance to this area will be investigated with particular emphasis focused on Norwegian policy as a potential model for Finland. Finland's unique approach to a policy of active neutrality will then be examined, followed by an investigation of what Finlandization means to the Finns, including the role of the dominant personality of President Kekkonen. The subject of Finlandization will be dealt with in depth in the next chapter.

Finally, in an analysis of these facts, the significance of Soviet foreign policy trends and reciprocal Finnish trends will be viewed.

With new weapons technology comes new strategy and, as mentioned in the opening paragraph, significant shifts in the posture of NATO's northern flank have taken place.

In quest of a base for her ever-growing submarine fleet, the Soviet Union turned to the only unrestricted access to the Atlantic that this vast, somewhat landlocked continent affords: the coast of the Kola Peninsula. The significance of this area can be appreciated in terms of the nuclear balance itself. Denial of this area to Soviet submarines would seriously impair the Soviet's retaliatory capacity.³ This area has the world's largest naval and submarine base and one

of the world's mightiest concentrations of military power.⁴ The Soviet Union's strength on NATO's northern flank has a direct bearing on the East-West nuclear balance. The Soviets have been deploying their Delta Class 14,000 ton nuclear submarines armed with SSN 8 missiles out from Murmansk, each with a range of 5,000 miles.⁵

Of the four Soviet fleets, the Northern fleet is without doubt the most powerful. "It contains two-thirds of the second-strike capability of the Soviet strategic forces (in ballistic missile submarines) and boasts 185 submarines and between four and five hundred surface warships."⁶ The commander of North Norway characterizes the Soviet military complex in the Kola Peninsula as the largest and most concentrated base in the world.⁷ Complementing this material is a ground force that even by conservative estimate is over half the size of Finland's entire population. "Including the Ground Forces Senior Units, the estimated total of soldiers in the Kola Peninsula amounts to 270,000."⁸

Having seen the intensely ominous nature of things to the east, let us turn to a brief examination of Finnish domestic defenses.

Universal conscription is the law of the land in Finland, obligating all males between seventeen and sixty years of age to military service. From this population base, forty thousand men are cycled through an eight month enlistment consisting primarily of training. This maintains a regular army of

approximately forty thousand supplemented by a reserve of almost seven hundred thousand.⁹ This represents a higher ratio of reservists to active duty than any other western nation.¹⁰

In 1971 parliamentary action was initiated to reevaluate the Finnish defensive posture. It should be noted, this is the same time frame in which it was recognized not only in Finland, but throughout the free world, that a growing threat was posed by the Soviet activity in the Kola Peninsula.

Partially as an outgrowth of these parliamentary investigations, military staff members were assigned to civil defense district councils to effect a permanent liaison with the civil authorities. In addition a new general secretary of the civil defense organization, a senior colonel, was recruited from the regular army. This obvious emphasis on the integration of the civil defenses into the overall defense structure was combined with a shift to an area defense concept and a steady modernization program.

While publicly adhering to a defense strategy based on repelling an attack from the West, the obvious perceived threat comes from the opposite direction.¹¹ Justification for a bolstering of area defenses where the Soviet forces would most likely invade is based on the principle that Finland cannot be used as a staging area for operations in the strategically important northern seas.¹²

Having set the stage for this investigation of the factors impacting on formulation of Finnish foreign policy toward the Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula, one can now turn to examination of pertinent facts.

While the perspective of this thesis is primarily looking east from Finland, the Scandinavian neighbors to the north and west cannot be ignored in answering the precis. All five Nordic nations share common history and culture as well as political traditions and systems. With these common roots, it was not unnatural for these comparatively small powers to band together for common economic benefit. Nevertheless, separate paths toward security were followed. Finland followed Sweden on a policy of neutrality while Norway, Denmark and Iceland allied themselves within NATO. On the surface this split might represent an exploitable weakness from the Soviet point of view, but a closer examination would reveal quite the opposite probability. Should the Russians attempt to lure Norway and Denmark away from NATO by encouraging the formation of a Scandinavian bloc, the risk of the Scandinavian neutrals drifting westward would arise.¹³ This would be unacceptable to the Soviets, particularly in the case of Finland as it would represent the prospect of having NATO on the threshold of the "world's largest naval and submarine base."¹⁴

Finland had no real choice initially in determining what her foreign policy would be, and many doubted the assuredness of Finland's survival as an independent nation. However, the

interdependence among the Scandinavian states, in the sense that what happens to one affects all of the others, gave the Nordic nations the strength of independence through their unity. In January 1949 when Denmark and Norway were on the verge of joining NATO, the Soviets acknowledged the presence of this balance by their expressed concern, particularly to Norway.¹⁵ In summary, the Scandinavian bloc, for all its fragmentation, remains a balanced, secure area to be reckoned with as much more than merely five mini-states.

Having placed Finland in context with its Nordic neighbors, an interpretation of the Finns reaction to Soviet foreign policy is necessary in order to fully develop the often misunderstood relationship between the USSR and Finland.

An explanation of the abused word, Finlandization, will serve both to define some terms and to illustrate a key Finnish perspective toward the Soviet Union.

Out of World War II came the Finnish philosophy of putting foreign policy before domestic concerns as a matter of survival. While Finland's neutrality is dictated by necessity, it is also based on the perceived national interest and supported by most of the constituents. The basis for this support is embodied in the most important single factor impacting on Soviet-Finnish relations: President Urho Kekkonen. He has been the leader of the Finnish people since 1956 and was reelected to six additional years on 16 January 1978 by an overwhelming majority. An avid sportsman at the age of 78,

Kekkonen skis and hunts with the enthusiasm of a man half his age. His vitality is present in his leadership and diplomacy alike. To endure the three decades of political life he has been through would be noteworthy in itself. Yet Kekkonen has risen to leadership of not only his own people, but plays a significant role on the international scene.

Urho Kekkonen became involved in politics as a member of parliament and served as Minister of Justice and Interior prior to World War II. Finland's post-war actions were dictated extensively by the Soviets through the imposition of vast war reparations, as was mentioned previously. Though Finland emerged a loser in 1944, she still retained her independence, preserved her constitutional system and was not subjected to foreign occupation forces. As a member of President Paasikivi's cabinet, Kekkonen was intimately involved in restoring relations with the Soviet Union. The aim of this post-war approach to foreign policy was to establish a firm basis of trust with both the Soviet Union and Scandinavia, a policy known as the Paasikivi Line. Doctor Kekkonen formed his first cabinet in March of 1950 and functioned as Prime Minister until his election as President in 1956, an office he has held without interruption ever since.

This brief capsule of Finnish history since World War II should serve to show what a vital role Kekkonen has played in developing contemporary Finnish foreign policy, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union.

Kekkonen also recognizes the importance of personalities in conducting foreign policy. He prides himself on the friends he has on the world political scene and considers it "extremely important to get to know the persons responsible for the political leadership of another country."¹⁶ He has consistently demonstrated his adherence to this trust in dealing with leaders of his eastern neighbor from Stalin to Brezhnev. The Soviet orientation toward personalities combines with Kekkonen's personal ability to make him an essential part of Finnish neutrality. "That President Kekkonen has fulfilled his task in a masterly manner is undeniable; as he himself once had occasion to remark, in his contacts with Soviet leaders he has never relinquished his nation's dignity."¹⁷ It is difficult to overstate the importance of Kekkonen as an individual in Finnish foreign policy in general, but most especially in the rapport he has attained in dealing with the Kremlin.

Soviet domination often manifests itself in economic terms. The object of the USSR's attention is often subjected to the imposition of economic dependence in critical areas. This characteristic is prevalent throughout Eastern Europe with the majority of the energy flowing from east to west behind the Iron Curtain. Finland was also a victim of this dependence but has demonstrated an increasing independence commensurate with her emerging posture. Finnish trade with the Soviet Union has increased from 1954 when it comprised 18% of the total to the current levels (1977) of 20%.¹⁸

However, this slight increase is not considered indicative of greater dependence but rather symptomatic of the ailing nature of Finland's economy in general. For example, the forest industry products which comprise over half of Finland's exports, have been in low demand in the West.

Trade provisions are contained in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA, Appendix A) and also, a remainder of the harsh provisions of the war indemnities. These, however, fall far short of the sort of constraints that would dictate dependence on the Soviet Union.

The one area that ties Finland to the Soviet Union economically is energy. At the opening ceremonies of Finland's first nuclear power plant in March 1977, President Kekkonen conceded that fully 70% of Finland's energy resources are imported and that the Soviet Union is the focal point of this supply.¹⁹ Nevertheless, just as the Finns realize the significance of their dependence, so do they recognize the need to develop alternate sources. The strength of Soviet leverage is decreasing as resources are depleted and as international markets become more open to Finland. Finland, and to a lesser extent, the East European nations are drawing away from energy dependence on the Soviet Union. Also, future obligations in trade pacts concerning manufactured goods reflect increases in total dollar value, but no mention of net increases in percentages of imports are made. As a result, the Finns are

successfully shifting away from the uneconomical aspects of relationships with her eastern neighbor to the competitive and more profitable markets of the west.

As complicated and contradictory as Finnish political history is, clearly the underlying motif has always been adherence to independence and peaceful coexistence.²⁰ In this quest Finland has recognized the growing opportunities for small countries to influence international politics.²¹

The seeming concurrence and parallel views held by the Soviet Union and Finland belie a vastly different motivation in many areas. Extensive military buildup in Lapland is justified to Moscow as defense against the imperialist western world. In reality there is only one conceivable purpose for Finnish forces being moved to where they are - to resist an incursion from the east. What Moscow views as ever-increasing dependence is viewed as just the opposite by outsiders.

The perception of increased flexibility by the Finns is exercised quite moderately with little overt demonstration of change in policy. Such things as the new emphasis on the strategic nature of Lapland is a demonstration of the willingness of the Finns to express their security drives.

Defense expenditures proposed for the next five years show some increases in all areas (See Appendix B). This, however, does not reflect all of the defense related peripheral programs which account for significant contributions to the whole effort. For example, the labor budget provides for

millions of Finnish marks to be spent on military construction under the auspices of a program to gainfully employ seasonal workers, particularly in Lapland.²² The end result is significantly expanded facilities such as barracks and training areas with no cost accounting attributed to defense spending - a sensitive area in the Soviet's eyes.

It is clear that Finland is interacting with the Western world to a greater degree all the time. However, whether or not the motive can be attributed to the Soviets' military concentration of activity in the Kola Peninsula is doubtful. In spite of the seemingly steadfast nature of Finnish neutrality, there is considerable wavering in response to her eastern neighbor's foreign policy. As has been pointed out, consideration of Finland's security could allow for nothing else as the prime motivator. The Finns are quick to "pull the Bear's beard" on occasion and push to the limit on specific issues, having developed a keen sense of how far and on what issues she can extend herself.

No matter how much the geographic and historical factors serve to dictate Finland's direction, there is an obvious aversion to allowing Soviet influence to further encroach on the Finnish way of life.

Finland's participation on the United Nation's Security Council, a Finnish candidate (Mr. Max Jakobson) for secretary general of the United Nations, the Finns hosting the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a free trade deal

with the European community, all point to an emerging neutral state, fully capable of standing on her own. In summary, "it is hard...to find evidence of Soviet intervention in the Finns' essentially democratic political life."²³

An appropriate analogy of the relationship that Finland has with the Soviet Union is depicted by the harmonious courtship of the hippo by the tickbird, "tenuous, but mutually rewarding".²⁴ Finland is not in a position to pursue radically different alternatives, even with the perceived increased power of small nations mentioned previously. Finland is content to operate within the framework of the established institutions and as has been pointed out, has enjoyed a high measure of success.

Finland has altered her foreign policy as well as her self-defense, but only in so far as it is necessary to accomplish the goal of keeping the peace. The consistency of purpose that has been followed under the dominant leadership of Kekkonen has been matched by the flexibility necessary to live as neighbors of the Soviet Union.²⁵ No radical shifts in the Finnish approach to either her domestic or international affairs is anticipated. The Finns will continue to quietly achieve results through their policy of active neutrality and Finland will persist as the prime example of the success story of Yalta.

What then, can the victims of Soviet hegemony learn from the success of the Finns? In spite of the unique nature of

each country's circumstances and the nature of Soviet domination, and at the risk of over-simplifying the issues, there are common characteristics worth noting. First and foremost, President Kekkonen's example of winning the confidence of the Kremlin must be followed in order to have credibility in dealing with the Soviets. Sacrifices of priorities may have to be made such as substituting satisfaction of short term domestic goals with achievement of longer range foreign policy objectives. The countries of eastern Europe cannot afford to be totally introspective if they seek to emerge from under the shadow of Soviet domination.

By gaining the Kremlin's confidence the Finns were successful in removing the physical presence of the Soviet forces from within their borders. Given the perceived threat to the Soviet Union from other fronts such as China, it should be clear that the precedent established by the extensive duration of occupation by Soviet forces is not irreversible. The removal of this highly visible presence of power would go a long way toward compensating the far-sighted leader for any domestic short falls.

Finally, the East European leader with a view toward increased autonomy within realistic parameters will seek to achieve economic independence by expanding trade with the West. Limited advances in this direction have received tacit approval as the USSR increases her western trade as well.

The final subject to be dealt with in this chapter is the scenario of Soviet incursion toward the boundaries of NATO on the northern flank. To date the Norwegians have kept the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in exercises conducted within her boundaries to a minimum out of consideration for the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. With the increased importance of the northern flank area, the level of involvement of all NATO members, to include West Germany, will doubtlessly rise. Whether the Kremlin's consent is solicited or their approval assumed, the element of risk that a reaction by the Soviets will take place is significant. The invoking of article two of the Treaty of FCHA with Finland could certainly be an option the Soviets would consider, for it would provide the opportunity for a tremendous show of force all along the Norwegian-Finnish borders. The reaction of the Finns to such a military incursion is quite possibly discounted by the Soviets, but the likelihood of Finland resisting in hopes of gaining western support is increasingly probable as the Finns level of interaction with the western world increases. Given the Norwegian disposition and geographic position, NATO forces could well be quick to accept a Finnish invitation to meet the Soviet challenge on what is literally neutral territory. This would provide NATO with a much stronger position from which to meet the threat and would provide the option of folding the Finns into the protective shield of NATO and reestablishing the

state of active neutrality which exists now. Assuming the thesis of this paper is legitimate - that the Finns are increasingly inclined toward the West - they would solicit NATO's intervention and the Soviet Union would be forced into a no-win situation short of initiating a global conflict.

In summary, the significance of Europe's northern flank warrants serious consideration, and the role of the Finns cannot be dismissed as that of just another Soviet satellite. Far from being dominated by the Soviet Union, Finland leads the way toward autonomy among East European nations.

IV. FINLANDIZATION

When CSCE convened in Helsinki in July of 1975, Finland demonstrated to the world what most have been too busy to take notice of: this small neighbor of the Soviet Union was on its way to the culmination of a foreign policy line which had taken it from being a beaten Axis ally in 1945, to a free nation playing an active role in world politics in spite of its geographic constraints. President Kekkonen hailed the holding of the final stage of the CSCE as "a significant demonstration of the confidence and respect enjoyed by Finland's peace seeking, active policy of neutrality."¹ What Finland's position is and how it got there is important.

In one lengthy sentence George Naude sums up what most western statesmen would agree is a valid assessment of Finland's position:

The dilemma that the Finns face is that the closer they come in a conflict situation to the Soviet side, the more likely it is that they will simply be included in hostile action from the western side, while on the other hand if the Soviet leaders once feel that there is anything the least unreliable in the Finnish attitude, retaliation from the Soviet side will occur.²

What would appear on the surface to be an untenable position has, in most respects, become one of increasing stability following Finland's policy of active neutrality. The purpose of this chapter is fourfold: 1) to demonstrate the deliberate nature of Finnish foreign policy as something considerably

more than submissive, 2) to show how President Kekkonen has developed this foreign policy and display the vital role Kekkonen has played in his persistent pursuit of strengthening Finland's position, 3) to speculate on the applicability of this unique approach to other countries, and finally 4) to tie these elements into a comprehensive view of Finlandization.

The approach that will be taken is to briefly summarize from chapter two how Finland got to where she was in 1944, and then to trace Kekkonen's involvement in directing the international affairs of Finland. Out of this analysis of three decades of one man's statesmanship, a determination will be made as to whether a deliberate pattern of foreign policy is present and whether or not Kekkonen's goals have been realized. Beyond the obvious implications this has for Finland's future, the conclusions will also include an appraisal of the potential of Finland's foreign policy as a model for other small powers to follow.

The historical and geographical basis of this analysis should not be taken as reliance on a relatively simple conceptualization of a terribly complex issue. Kekkonen himself admits that "excessive emphasis on geographical factors and historical analogies can lead to false oversimplification."³ At the same time it is important to have an appreciation for the harsh realities of the situation.

There are many aspects of Finland's position with respect to the Soviet Union that are unique. Perhaps the most

significant of the individual facets of the Finns is the historical experience, the autonomous nature of which is in such sharp contrast to that of the Russians. Combined with this are the unalterable facts of geography, putting two nations of widely diverse backgrounds together on an extensive (750 mile) border. Though not unique in itself, in the context of a European scenario Finland is the only European nation in such a position to have avoided Soviet domination.

Finland also has a consistent history of strong resistance in the face of Soviet intervention which again distinguishes the Finns from her neighboring Baltic States and the minimal attempts at discouraging Soviet intervention displayed in war ravaged Europe in the late 1940's, as well as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The durability of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is also singularly notable as no other nation in Eastern Europe has adhered to their original pact or fulfilled all war indemnities to the Soviet Union.

Finally, with the exception of Yugoslavia, no other European nation has had the continuity of leadership that President Kekkonen's long tenure has lent to the stability of Finland. Ironically, no other European nation has had its name verbalized to portray Soviet hegemony, a notion this thesis will analyze in depth.

On the surface, Finland's unique characteristics would seem to invalidate from the start any potential comparison for purposes of using Finland as a model. Approaching the problem in general terms may help to resolve some of these peculiarities. For example, the significance of the geographical factor can be assessed from three perspectives: local, regional and global security problems.⁴

The problem of the defense of Leningrad has involved Finland in the local security issue for centuries. As Peter the Great's "Window to the West," control of the approach over the Karelian Isthmus from Finland was deemed essential. This issue was finally resolved in 1940 after the Winter War when the Soviets absorbed this area which formerly constituted 12% of Finland.

Of increasingly greater importance from the regional point of view is the security of the Soviet Union's warm water ports on the Arctic Ocean. This is inseparably linked to the global perspective as one of the world's largest single concentrations of military might has been built up in the Kola Peninsula.⁵ This area had been an issue in the signing of the Treaty of Tartu as the security of the Murmansk railroad arose.⁶ Since 1918 the changing nature of strategic doctrine and the increased level of technology have combined to emphasize the significance of this region tremendously. The extent to which this regional aspect of security has merged into the global perspective has had a profound impact on Finnish

regional security and perhaps even on local security. The historical background covered in Chapter II and the detailed assessment of the strategic significance of the Kola Peninsula in Chapter III should serve to support this statement.

In summary, the geographical relationship of both Finland and the Soviet Union has been compounded significantly by the introduction of Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula.

If there is one thread of continuity to both Finnish foreign policy and Soviet-Finnish relations in particular, it is the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This relatively concise document consisting of eight articles, plays a dominant role in many segments of both domestic and international politics in Finland. As pointed out in the historical background of Chapter II, it is the point of reference for many of President Kekkonen's expressions on foreign policy, which will be demonstrated later, as well as the touch-stone for the Kremlin in expressing their dissatisfaction with the Finns.

Were the significance of any one article of this treaty to be accorded dominant importance it would be article two. This is primarily on the basis of its having been invoked several times during the last three decades, calling for conferences in response to a perceived threat to the security of the area. Since the Finns never called for conferences of this nature, it would be safe to say the threat was one

perceived by the Soviets. These instances of crises negotiations will each be discussed later.

A second basis of judging the significance of particular segments of this treaty would be the amount of time invested in drafting them. Obviously this is bound to reflect the importance of the issues of 1948 as opposed to contemporary priorities. Putting the relevance of current issues aside for the moment, the overwhelming majority of the treaty writing time was in fact spent in formulating the first two articles of the treaty. As the current Undersecretary of State put it in writing about the treaty, both Finland and Russia:

explicitly and particularly discussed the military articles of the draft treaty - the first and second articles. A great deal of work was done on them, they were precisioned and they were the object of long negotiations. Their details were clarified and efforts were made to ensure that there would be as little space as possible for interpretation and speculation.⁷

Some contend that Finland's political leadership has generally tried to be included by both the Great Power blocs in the group of neutral countries.⁸ The primary requirement for legitimate consideration as a neutral fluctuates from a strictly legal interpretation of refraining from involvement in wars between other states to a philosophical outlook which establishes "an unshakable desire for neutrality"⁹ as the basis of neutral status.

Many point to the FCMA as the source document that violates any interpretation of neutrality. The fact of the matter is that technically there is no obligation for Finland to assist

the Soviet Union unless an attack against the USSR is perpetuated through Finland.¹⁰ How realistic is it to view a NATO attack on the northern flank? Hardly the most plausible of scenarios. The examination in Chapter II of each instance when consultations were called for under the provisions of FCMA served to clarify this.

Kekkonen has gained confidence from having bided his time in the "Night Frost" negotiations. The fact that he was in Hawaii when the "Note Crisis" arose combined with the reassurance he had received during his just completed visit with President Kennedy made Kekkonen decide to subdue the crisis by not treating it as one. He played the theme he had argued throughout his tour of the United States to the hilt: Finland had nothing to fear from the Soviets for relations were sound.

When Kekkonen returned home a week later he continued to emphasize the success of Finland's policy of neutrality and persisted in down-playing any talk of a Finnish crisis with the Soviets. Instead he pointed the finger at the Western Powers who he said were in a crisis situation over Berlin, not the Baltic.¹¹

What should be remembered when looking at these periods of crisis is that the foreign policy that resolved them was developed over a long period of time. Kekkonen's foreign policy is not just an extension of Paasikivi's. As Minister of Justice and five-time Prime Minister, Kekkonen was thoroughly involved in the structuring of Finland's future for a decade

prior to being elected President in 1956. In essence, Kekkonen is post World War II foreign policy.

To reiterate the conclusions reached in Chapter II concerning the role of Finland's President in quelling the "Night Frost" crisis, Kekkonen's first steps were to remind the Finnish people of the priority of foreign policy over domestic considerations. He leaned heavily on the words of the popular Paasikivi whom he had recently succeeded: "Our foreign policy can henceforth never run counter to the Soviet Union and our Eastern neighbor must be convinced of our determination to prove this."¹²

Pointing then to the "successful growth of this policy, Kekkonen cited the return of the Porkkala enclave as its crowning achievement."¹³ Then, after a short digression into the effects of overexercising one's freedom of speech, Kekkonen outlined the global tensions which had prompted the Soviets to call for consultations.

What the President did when he went to the Soviet Union five months after this speech was given is clear as far as results go. Kekkonen returned, followed closely by the return of the Soviet Ambassador to Helsinki signaling the end of the "Night Frost." Restraint in the press was once again called for by Kekkonen to build up the degree of confidence Finland's interests require.¹⁴ Discussions with Krushchev had been fruitful.

In resolving the Note Crisis, President Kekkonen embarked on his personal diplomacy with the Soviet leader once again after chastising Finland's right wing front for failing to convey the confidence of the Finns in their foreign policy.¹⁵ This sort of deviation from the established policy would surface again to hinder Kekkonen's efforts to build confidence and attempt to erode the foundation of the FCMA Treaty.

In 1976 a book was published in the Soviet Union that offered a very disturbing interpretation of the direction of Finland's foreign policy. From the Finnish perspective the book was a slap in the face from Moscow who had been perceived as a loyal friend. Most regarded the book as simply a "new edition of a book already published in Finnish" by the same author in 1974.¹⁶ The disturbing nature of the new edition was that the tracing of history led to a conclusion that President Kekkonen and his predecessor, Paasikivi, had tried to distort the meaning of the 1948 FCMA Treaty.

The crux of the Soviet fears expressed in the book were that the military cooperation clauses of the treaty were being obscured by Kekkonen's emphasis on neutrality. From the Finnish perspective there was never a basis for such Soviet suspicions. Through the eyes of Max Jakobson the purpose of the Komissarov book was just the opposite: "to obscure Finnish neutrality by emphasizing the military articles of the FCMA Treaty."¹⁷ Jakobson further speculates that the eventual aim of the Soviets is to obtain a binding alliance with Finland to replace the FCMA Treaty.¹⁸

One must conclude from the dialogue that the problem is a deterioration of the trust and confidence so carefully built up by the Finns. The ability of Kekkonen to placate the Soviets as he had done so many times previously serves to reinforce Finland's role on two counts. First, the Soviets got the Finns to answer for their actions whether guilty or not, thus reestablishing that the Finns know their place and that the Kremlin is in control of the situation. Secondly, the Finns have succeeded in not only bolstering the Soviets' confidence in their control, but have reinforced world opinion that Finland is being "Finlandized" - thus perpetuating the circle of forces which allow President Kekkonen to increase the latitude of his policy of active neutrality.

Evidence of this is seen in two events which took place within one week in May 1977. At a Moscow dinner hosted by Brezhnev, the address to the gathering for Kekkonen given by the Soviet leader reaffirmed that there were no animosities and denied any loss of confidence in Finland.¹⁹ One week later Kekkonen received the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Helsinki; the first visit by a top-ranking United States military commander since the end of World War II. In the judgment of many it was a rather daring move by Kekkonen,²⁰ but was justified in the Finns' eyes by the signing of the East-West declaration.

The aura that this relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland begins to take on can be confusing indeed. On the

one hand, it would appear that the Finns have gone out of their way to placate the Russian Bear in times of crises and have made concessions almost to the point of subservience. Conversely, President Kekkonen has persisted in pursuing a policy which is obviously contrary to the desires of the Soviets. Unfortunately, it is the former characterization which seems to get all of the attention under the catchy code word, Finlandization. It may be useful to look at the origins of this word and thereby gain a further understanding of both Western mis-impressions and what they may mean to Finland.

The nature of the word Finlandization defies strict definition as evidenced by the wide range of interpretation applied to it. What Piere Hasner labels "a milder and more modern form of Sovietization"²¹ is the same thing that Krosby defines "reconciling one's differences with the Soviet Union."²² Likewise, there exists a similar divergence of views between Kekkonen who simply says that the Finns don't deserve this label, that it is incorrect and unjust; and Richard Lowenthal who uses Finlandization to replace Communization as the Soviets' goal toward West Germany.²³

Regardless of the origins of the word, the focus of this thesis will be on what it currently defines. This is not completely disregarding the significance of the coining of the word to apply to "spineless acceptance of Soviet domination,"²⁴ or to ignore the implications that use of this elusive word have had for other Eastern and Western European nations.

Rather, it is an attempt to analyze how the impressions conveyed through the Soviet Union have impacted on the Russo-Finnish relationship.

It would be easy to say that the Soviets have been oblivious to the impact of Western opinion on this relationship with Finland. In fact, the end result of this view is not totally false: that Finland is and has been a showcase of Soviet peaceful coexistence is definitely a part of what constitutes this reasonably harmonious relationship. Because a portion of reality in both parties' eyes is captured in this assessment, and because it is not terribly complex, many analysts are quick to embrace what this author would judge too simplistic a notion.

The interpretation that this thesis is attempting to support is that included in the very deliberate pursuit of a foreign policy of active neutrality is the effective and almost ingenious exploitation of Western opinion by Finland to gain increased autonomy. Unfortunately, to prove such an hypothesis conclusively would necessitate the admission by Kekkonen that the Finns do in fact use Western opinion to implement their foreign policy. Certainly such an admission would not be forthcoming since it would defeat the very purpose of this approach. Instead the support will be in what in legal terms would have to fall into the category of circumstantial evidence.

To begin with, a brief look at the antithesis of this conceptualization may help to reinforce the credibility of this notion of "reverse psychology." If in fact the Finns do consider the term, Finlandization, and its use to be derivative in nature, would not their solution be to refute the misconception by presenting supporting factual data? Certainly it would not be difficult to build an effective case for Finnish autonomy, particularly through comparison to any of a number of East European states. One of the more widely publicized versions of such a disclaimer has been extracted from the Scandinavian Review and is widely distributed. Written by H. Peter Krosby, it offers the variety of definitions of Finlandization previously mentioned and goes on to put forth the Finnish interpretation.

The net effect, however, of a Finnish government disclaimer such as Krosby wrote would be to call attention to a situation that the Soviets would find more than a little embarrassing. What policy would ensue is anyone's guess, but it is safe to say it would have a negative impact on the Finns' pursuit of active neutrality.

Returning to the original view that the Finns are effectively using negative Western opinion in their favor, it is possible to envision two ways that this circumstance could have been arrived at: happenstance or intentionally. For the original pursuit to have been intentional would have required a vast and deliberate promotion of their cause while staging

an even stronger opposition view point through a diverse cross section of world press. Much more plausible is the notion that the Finns were clever enough to capitalize on the all too quick condemnation of Western press journalists. Kennan's view is that:

...the Finns have conducted themselves vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with a remarkable dignity, with cool nerves and composure, and with a quiet but firm and successful insistence on the right to lead their own lives, internally, after their own fashion and in accord with their own principles. In no way have they deserved to be held up as the example of a humiliating subservience to a larger power.²⁵

It would be in keeping with the Finns' stoic approach to such matters to initially not even recognize the slandering of their good name and to quietly discount it as the shallow interpretation of their position that it is. Then it was a simple matter to let the press ramble on with this fancy new word in their vocabulary with each use further convincing the Kremlin of their overwhelming control of their "showcase" in the north.

An element of this evolution of foreign policy alluded to earlier in the context of Kekkonen's resolution of the "Night Frost" crisis is freedom of speech in Finland. While the Finns would tell you that they have a press with a sense of responsibility about criticism of sensitive issues, Westerners in general condemn the Finnish government for blatant censorship.

Certainly there are forces working against a totally free Finnish press, the primary ones being from within the Soviet Union. Usually only the strongly worded accusations of Tass and Pravda appear in the Western press. A flurry of such articles appeared in the spring of 1975 starting with Pravda alleging an anti-Communist campaign was under way. The banter back and forth over the internal politics accuses Moscow of promoting the cause of minority Stalinists and Tass responding with warnings about reactionary forces in Finland.²⁶

Other threats to the freedom of the press come from within as factions of the Finnish government attempt to impose economic pressures through press subsidiaries. The risk becomes then that only party-affiliated papers would get support.²⁷

The effects of these soviet outbursts make the Finnish politicians aware of the fact that they are treading on sensitive issues close to the margin of toleration. For the sake of Finland's survival, certainly this must be considered a positive aspect of the overall issue. Whether this benefit offsets the costs incurred by way of suspicion of one's own printed matter is for the Finns to decide. Our own values cannot be imposed on the drastically different situation of the Finns; nor is it the purpose of this thesis to make judgments on the morality of Finland's domestic politics. It is

safe to conclude that the government does effectively impose some restrictions on the press, but what government, including the United States', doesn't? To differentiate between what is self-imposed out of a sense of responsibility and what results from government intervention is impossible except in the most extreme situations.

In one of the more recent works concerned with Finlandization, editors Ginsburgs and Rubinstein prefaced a collection of essays by citing as one of their objectives "to examine the utility of the often mentioned but little analyzed notion of "Finlandization" as a possible explanation of Moscow's strategic design for dealing with Western Europe."²⁸

While a thorough examination of this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, the framework for analysis certainly lends itself to this study. Seven characteristics are outlined by Ginsburgs and Rubinstein which will serve as our point of reference for accessing the notion of Finlandization in terms of how accurately it describes Finland's relations with the Soviets. In the conclusion an extension of this analysis will be made to reflect on how appropriate it would be to make an analogy to a central European situation.

The first characteristic, "responsiveness in foreign policy to Soviet preferences," can be dealt with in short order. While degrees of responsiveness are subjective in nature, a response to Soviet preference is present in the foreign policy of any and all countries dealing with the

Kremlin. It is a function of the superpower status accorded Finland's neighbor and by virtue of geographic realities that relations with Moscow must be attended to with somewhat greater attention than other small powers who enjoy relative isolation with respect to proximity to a great power.

Secondly, "avoidance of alliance with countries deemed by the Soviet Union to be competitors or rivals" is again relatively simple to deal with from the Finnish perspective. Finland has no alliances of a military nature in the strictest sense of the word and in no interpretation can be viewed as seeking any. The government in Helsinki is indeed wary of any alliance, not just with the West but, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter, persists in a very narrow interpretation of their only alliance of any sort: the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

"Acceptance of neutrality in peace or war" is indeed the ultimate aim of the Finns. In spite of the military clause of the FCMA and the Soviet interpretations, there is an unequivocal stand of neutrality maintained by Kekkonen which has shown its worth in crisis situations. The only qualifications attached to this definition of Finnish foreign policy is the word active, which serves to depict the role the Finns seek to play in world affairs as a neutral.

The fourth characteristic of Finlandization as defined by Ginsburgs and Rubinstein is of particular importance when

viewing Finland's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. "Abstention from membership in regional and international groupings considered unfriendly by Moscow" has hardly been the approach taken by this thoroughly Nordic country. Blocking of membership in NORDEC, a proposed Scandinavian economic organization, is pointed to by many as an example of Soviet influence in Finnish affairs. The actual outcome, however, was in fact a step by step implementation of the individual elements of the agreement which in the end constituted an arrangement which was virtually the same result as if the treaty had been signed. Other Finnish economic arrangements such as free trade within the European Economic Community are further evidence of Finnish autonomy which contradicts this characteristic of Finlandization outright.

Self-censorship, or as Ginsburgs and Rubenstein define their fifth characteristic: "restraint over the media in one's country to muffle or minimize criticism of the USSR, so as to avoid possible provocation" is another very subjective area. One person in a position to evaluate this topic, Olli Kivinen, foreign affairs editor of the Helsingin Sanomat, made an important distinction between self-censorship and a responsible press.²⁹ The basis of comparison for Americans is primarily our own extremely sensational press, hardly a reasonable standard. Drawing an analogy of the antagonism of the United States by Canada is not an entirely appropriate example, but serves to point out that even in our cooperative dealings with

our northern neighbors there is an obvious measure of practical restraint exercised within Canada to avoid unnecessarily unsettling good neighborly relations. Even Kivinen is willing to admit that some segments of the media, particularly the state-run television, go beyond the point of being responsible. This is common knowledge, however, and the opinions expressed on the TV are treated accordingly. They are not ignored entirely, but seldom are even of a controversial nature. One might almost view the television's party line as a concession made to the Soviets for the sake of retaining a free press.

The last two characteristics of Finlandization are closely related and are not viewed by this author as worth more than passing mention: 6) "compensatory gestures in commercial and cultural contacts with the USSR, extending to treaties and diplomatic consultations, to effect disparities in the relationship with the USSR on the one hand and Western European countries on the other and (7) openness to penetration by Soviet ideas and media."³⁰

If these seven characteristics then constitute Finlandization, perhaps the Peoples Republic of China is the only country which is not Finlandized.

V. COMMUNISTS' ROLE IN FINLAND

"There is one country in western Europe where communist participation in a democratic government is not a matter for wild surmises - but routine."¹ The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the communists achieved this unique relationship and to determine the role of coalition politics in communist perceptions and theories as they have been developed in Finland. The approach that will be taken is to trace the historical development of the Finnish Communist Party as it evolved from the beginning of the twentieth century. Secondly, the character of the Finnish communists will be assessed and the views of communists with regard to the opposition and the other political parties; employing coalition politics as the conceptual framework. Finally, an attempt will be made to estimate any potential impact that the Finnish Communist Party could have beyond the scope of the domestic politics of Finland.

Perhaps the most important element the communists have in their favor is the respect of their fellow Finns for firmly rooted democratic ideals which included respect for minorities. This was the thrust of Karl Wiik's argument in opposition to the attempts to ban him and his fellow party members from participation in Finnish government. Reminders like this allowed the communists to capture forty of the two hundred seats

in the first post-war parliamentary elections, in spite of two successive bitter defeats suffered at the hands of the Red Army.²

Within this relationship the communist party maintains in Finland is seen what could be labeled a microcosm of the broader scope of the Russo-Finnish relationship. The analogy being that the communists are to the Finnish political system what the Finns are to the Soviet Union with the key to the success of both relationships being tolerance, respect for the limits of interaction and trust.

What this analogy enables us to do, within reasonable constraints, is to apply pertinent principles of action to each relationship and thereby increase the scope of understanding in both areas, based on available knowledge on each. Accordingly, reference will be drawn to this analogy in general terms throughout this chapter.

The Soviets had failed in their overt attempts to foster the birth of a communist leadership after the Winter War in 1940. The head of the ill-fated puppet government which the Kremlin had installed was Otto Kuusinen who had been a close advisor to Stalin as a prominent theoretician of Marxism-Leninism in the Comintern. Both Lenin and Stalin relied on Kuusinen to provide doctrinal justification for their policies.³ How Kuusinen maneuvered himself into this position provides a lesson in the consequences of coalition politics.

Before examining this critical juncture in the history of the Finnish Communist Party, it is important to understand how the communists emerged from the civil war. The roots of Finnish Socialism can be traced back into the period when the Finns were a part of the Russian Grand Duchy. An industrialization of the timber industry introduced mechanization and along with it came labor associations. The Tsar had initially approved these organizations in concept in 1883, and by 1896 they had evolved into the democratic socialism that had been growing throughout Scandinavia.⁴

The first faltering steps of this forerunner of the communist party were interrupted by imposition of the stringent constraints of Russification in 1899. While the Finns were united in opposition to this infringement on their autonomous traditions, they were divided on what form their resistance would take. Proposed action covered the spectrum from passive resistance to armed insurrection. Just as Finnish society was split on this issue, so too did a schism develop within the Social Democrats. The antagonism between the two factions surfaced in the 1904 elections and festered until the spark of revolution erupted as a general strike in conjunction with similar events in 1905 in Russia. The ranks of the Finnish Socialists increased five-fold during this period of turmoil, and several important personalities in Finnish politics emerged including Otto Kuusinen, Karl Wiik, and Väinö Tanner.⁵

Preoccupied with domestic problems and realizing the Russification effort was failing, Nicholas II withdrew his edicts and the Finnish cabinet set about establishing a diet reform. Out of this reform arose a unicameral legislation which Kuusinen labeled a semblance of a democratic institution.⁶ As a left wing Socialist leader, Kuusinen continued to press for reform, advocating increased parliamentary power and independence from the Tsar. The inevitable revolution in Russia was anticipated as the time to fulfill the ambitions of Finnish freedom seekers. The outbreak of World War I with its decimating effects on Russia eventually gave rise to civil war, an opportunity that the Finns took advantage of in order to gain their independence.

On the road to freedom, the Finns turned to Germany for assistance, a bid for aid that was viewed as essential to breaking away from the Tsar. The precedent established by the Finns was to be a telling one, as future fraternization with Germany would tragically complicate Finland's relationship with her eastern neighbor three decades later.

After considerable debate within Finnish ranks and frustrating bargaining with the provisional government in Petrograd, civil war erupted in Finland. A new figure rose to prominence as the need for military expertise was answered by a thirty year veteran of service with the Imperial Army - Gustaf Mannerheim.

Mannerheim's reputation preceeded his shift from military to political life. Dubbed "the aristocrat in politics" by Rintala in his book, Four Finns, he relates that Mannerheim was one of the few human beings before whom Hitler showed any signs of humility after 1933.⁷ For a man who came to be known as the "father of Finland," it is somewhat ironic that as a consequence of the length of his service in the Imperial Army Mannerheim spoke Finnish poorly.⁸ All of the speculation and debate about the true allegiance of Mannerheim's loyalties, however, were dispelled in his staunch defense of his homeland. George Kennan put it so succinctly when he said Mannerheim was "100% Finnish."⁹

In April 1918 Mannerheim led the Finnish Whites and a supporting German force of division size against the Reds and succeeded in driving the Communist forces out of Finland into Moscow. Mannerheim then became head of state only to become embroiled in yet another war with Russia over disputed territory in Karelia, the first of several such disputes.

The peace of this conflict was concluded in the Treaty of Tartu by Paasikivi who succeeded in obtaining access to the Barents Sea for the Finns.

In July 1919 Karl Stahlberg was elected president with an assembly controlled by the two moderate parties (Agrarians and Progressives). To gain participation in the government the Social Democrats split with the communists who had been barred from Finnish politics.

The Finnish Reds that survived the brutal fighting of the Civil War escaped to the east. Among them was Kuusinen who quickly came under the influence of Lenin's writings which caused him to push for the formation of a Finnish Communist Party. By the end of August this had been accomplished in Moscow.

As the Finns stepped forward as a sovereign nation, they did so not as novices in self-government, but rather with a considerable democratic tradition. The population grew by fifteen percent in the twenty years preceeding World War II (3.36 to 3.89 million) and the primarily agricultural economy had ninety percent of the farmers as independent owners.¹⁰ The expansion of the "social state" was evidenced by the institution of the eight hour day, old age, accident and sickness insurance, maternity aid, legislation for the care of needy children and government owned utilities.¹¹

Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, Finland's Communist Party was in exile, although the spirit fermented in the ranks of the Social Democrats. The initial attempts to reconstitute their position failed, as mentioned earlier. In spite of Soviet support, the Finnish people successfully resisted Kuusinen's comeback. Just four years later, however, after the Finns succumbed to Soviet military might in the Continuation War, 23.5% of the popular vote went to the communist coalition.¹²

The Finnish Communist Party was legally a part of the Finnish political system with a legitimate base of support.

In addressing the views of the Finnish communists with regard to the opposition and other political parties, the primary source of information for developing the methodology and typology was William H. Riker's The Theory of Political Coalition. While this analysis will not adhere strictly to the theories put forth in this book, it will provide the basis of analysis of the Finnish political scene.

An example of Western misconceptions of the Finnish position is provided by Riker in his book mentioned above. In an example from the section "Politics in an Age of Manuever," Riker points out that "...the exact position of ...Finland... is somewhat ambiguous, although the United States acts as if it expects (Finland) to be absorbed ultimately into a Soviet alliance."¹³ While this may have been a valid assessment of the position and direction of Finland in 1962, the Western world's perception of Finland's position has significantly changed in the interim. The function of coalition politics has played a definite role in this shift to include the politics of the Finnish Communist Party.

Unlike Riker's description of the evolution of society in the age of manuever as shifting "in accordance with the size principle, the western coalition having diminished and the Communist one (expanding),"¹⁴ the role of the communists in Finland has stabilized. This is demonstrated by the table

of election results in Appendix C which shows that they consistently poll twenty percent of the vote.

Riker posits three main propositions about political coalitions. Without going into a detailed explanation of each and at the risk of oversimplifying a complex theory, a brief summary of each proposition will be put forth for purposes of application in discussion of the communist party's role in Finnish politics.

The size principle asserts that "with complete and perfect information, winning coalitions tend toward minimal winning size."¹⁵ Emphasis for critique here is placed on "ideal conditions" which seldom prevail, which Riker points out in his introductory chapter, wherein he lists four conditions prerequisite to application of his model.¹⁶ The tendency for leaders to "miscalculate sidepayments and to pay more for winning than winning is "objectively worth"¹⁷ has particular application to the position hardliners in the Finnish-Communist coalition, as will be demonstrated later.

The strategic principle is the second of Riker's assertions, predicated on an operative size principle, which holds that "participants in the final stages of coalition-formation should and do move toward a minimum winning coalition."¹⁸ This premise will be the basis of some speculation in the concluding portions of this chapter with regard to the future of the Finnish Communist Party.

The final assertion, the disequilibrium principle, is predicated on the size and strategic principles being operative. It maintains that "the systems or bodies are themselves unstable."¹⁹ Again, the relative strength of the communists in Finland's government will be assessed in this context with respect to the opposition.

The influence of the Soviet Union on the role of the Finnish Communist Party certainly cannot be discounted. For "living on the threshold of the Eastern colossus implies a constant shadowing in domestic and foreign affairs."²⁰ The nature of this influence can take on many different characteristics and, particularly with regard to the Finnish Communist Party, it has done so. The most blatant support was the actual installation of a Communist puppet government in 1940 headed by Otto Kuusinen. Since this miserable failure, overt Soviet encouragement and backing waned considerably, as the dominant figure of Urho Kekkonen prevailed in Finnish politics and the Soviet leadership gained increasing confidence in dealing with him. In spite of Kekkonen's tenure and the attendant stability this might reflect, the record shows the government changing an average of once a year with the role of the communists being significant in causing this trend.

The permanent opposition which marked the communists' stand since their failure to capitalize on the opportunity presented at the end of the Winter War was finally breached by compromise in 1966.²¹ The communists' involvement in a

coalition with the Soviet Democratic Party has been the object of considerable interest. The head of the Social Democrats and Finnish Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, is quick to point out the unique nature of the Finnish political system and the attendant peculiarities of this coalition. In an interview just prior to the January 1978 elections, Mr. Sorsa reflected the cautiousness that has characterized Finnish politics in general out of deference to the Soviet Union, and he cited the need to cater to Finland's political circumstance as a unifying force.

The Finnish model of cooperation not only involves the cooperation of the left but also three parties from the political center. The basis for cooperation is wider than in France and resembles more closely the compromesso/storico pattern with the difference, however, that in Finland the Social Democratic Party is clearly the biggest and that also the three parties in the center form a power stronger than the Communists.²²

Perhaps the most significant reason for resisting comparison to the other countries as a model is the risk of acquiring the label of Eurocommunist. The difficulty in defining this term is pointed out by Vernon Aspaturian who characterized Eurocommunism as difficult to conceptualize, dubbing it a "semantic orphan" and an imprecise term. As a product of a convenient, impressionistic label to identify tendencies, it is more self-critical than substantively constructive and has been attacked at all levels as too narrow a concept.²³

The Times assessment of the Finnish communists' position warrants the inclusion of this label in a modified version:

"Finn-Eurocommunists." This name is appropriate on the basis of the reformist nature of their programs and their willingness to work within governmental structure.²⁴

The segment of the Finnish Communist Party that remains opposed to the philosophy of working within the system are the hardline Stalinists headed by Sarrinen who has been SKP (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue - Finnish Communist Party) chairman since 1966. The right wing and the communist coalition as a whole were led by Miettunen from 30 November 1975 until 29 September 1976 when an economic crisis precipitated its collapse. The SKDL (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto - Finnish Peoples' Democratic League) had been the vehicle through which the communists had worked in spite of internal splits focusing primarily on the party's domestic affairs platform. Both left and right concur in expanding the state sector of industry, however, a gap "between the dogmatic and pragmatic behavior" exists on the issues of nationalization of banks and dismantling trade ties with the West, thus moving closer to the Soviet bloc.²⁵ The crux of the matter lies in the economic situation in Finland, which if it improves "the relative calm in Finnish domestic politics may be prolonged."²⁶

On international views, a necessary priority over internal affairs, they have little divergence from President Kekkonen's line of peace, security and progress. The communists are opposed, however, to any participation or dealings with NATO, EEC or other ties with the West which they blame for Finland's

domestic economic problems. Perhaps the most valuable function served by the communists in Finland is to serve as a "watchdog against 'right-wing' factions and as a vocal critic of other Nordic States' foreign and security policy."²⁷

There are ten political parties occupying the two hundred seats in Parliament with the largest single party consistently being the Social Democrats whose platform on social and economic issues is not unlike that of the other Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties. A close second and occasional forerunner is the Peoples' Democratic League which includes the communist party coalition within its ranks as mentioned previously. President Kekkonen is affiliated with the Center Party, formerly dubbed the Agrarian Party. As the old name implies, they count among their membership the farming sector and Finland's extensive rural community. The last of the four major parties, the Conservative Party, represents the interests of business and industry.

Other lesser parties include the Swedish Peoples' Party whose membership is composed primarily of the Swedish speaking Finnish population (6.5%), a minority group of decreasing numbers. Of approximately equal size are the Liberal Party and the Christian League of Finland. The last group of any size is the Rural Party - a liberal faction of the Center Party which represents a small portion of the agrarian and rural sector.

As shown by the breakdown of seats held by each party in parliament in Appendix D, there is a limited variation in voting patterns over the last three decades. This is tributable in part to the constant leadership of Kekkonen and to a great extent to the traditional voting patterns of the Finns.

A political sociologist, Erik Allardt, appears to support this supposition in one of the few serious studies of contemporary Finnish communism. From ecological research he concludes that communist support is to a large extent explained by traditions.²⁸

Party membership has come to follow economic interests rather closely while party members still maintain traditional affiliations. The result is that the fluctuations in the economy are reflected at the polls. Accordingly, the base of support of each party ebbs and rises with the measure of success gained by the incumbant decision makers. Consequently, the stability of the government is tied to their successful implementation of economic policy. The average of almost one government per year attests to the hazardous nature of this business. This should serve to provide some insight into the diversity of Finnish politics surrounding the Finnish Communist Party.

VI. NUCLEAR FREE ZONES

Having looked at the domestic relations of the Finnish political parties in general and the communist part in particular, it is now appropriate to turn to the dominant foreign policy issue of Finnish politics: a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone (or Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, NFZ). While the question of whether or not this is actually the foremost foreign policy issue may be raised and other topics staunchly defended, there can be no argument that the NFZ issue has arisen in the 1973-79 timeframe as an integral part of the Finnish defense plan and gathers attention from not only the Nordic sector by the international community as well.

It is this author's impression that the NFZ issue has arisen to the fore and the fact that NFZ is the theme of the 1978 yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy substantiates this view, at least from the Finnish perspective. As will be pointed out in this chapter, the attention paid to the Nordic issue warrants far more than token attention from both the Scandinavian countries and the superpowers alike. Hence, it should be understood within the context of international strategic arms limitation and the local and regional views as well.

On 28 May 1963 Finland's President Urho Kekkonen made a proposal for the establishment of a NFZ in the Nordic area. What was originally labeled a totally unrealistic approach,

motivated by yet another alleged display of submission to the Soviet Union has persisted in emerging as an increasingly plausible concept in arms control.¹

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the motives for this proposal and to assess the role it can be expected to play in the overall scheme of weapons control. The approach will be to review the brief evolution of NFZ's, to summarize the criticisms of the proposal and finally, to concentrate on the most recent developments reflected in President Kekkonen's speeches in Stockholm and Hamburg.

The essence of President Kekkonen's proposal put forth in 1963 and often repeated is contained in the following:

I am convinced that declaring the Nordic countries a nuclear-weapon-free zone would greatly stabilize the position of all the countries in the area. It would indisputably remove the Nordic countries from the sphere of speculation to which the development of nuclear strategy has given rise and ensure that this region remains outside international tensions.²

The issue of NFZ's cannot be taken out of context. It comprises only a small part of the whole strategic arms debate. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the entire issue, however, and no attempt will be made to expand the issue of NFZ's beyond what is necessary to put it properly into context.

If one had to reduce the NFZ issue to its bare essentials, there would be three periods during which significant modifications of the original proposal have occurred. Between 1959 and 1965 the NFZ concept was conceived and fostered during a

period of international political disengagement. From 1972 to 1975 the prominence of detente allowed for stress of the links between the Nordic region and the European continent based on stability. The current period of instability since 1978 was created by new weapons technology and the attendant threats from the superpowers.³

The dominant initial reaction one receives to the mention of President Kekkonen's 1963 proposal for a nuclear free zone in Scandinavia is skepticism. However, what began as a somewhat idealistic view of Nordic relations and the Scandinavian role in world affairs has evolved into a plan of increasing significance. While certainly not the primary focus of arms treaties in this age of SALT, CSCE and MFR, the current proposals of the Finns merit close examination.

The context from which the subject of a Nordic NFZ has arisen must be viewed with a full appreciation for the strategic significance of the northern European geographic area. The Kola Peninsula harbors one of the Soviet Union's most heavily militarized zones, "an area of rapidly increasing strategic importance for Moscow and the West."⁴ The greatest single system of concern to the Soviets is their SLBM fleet, over seventy percent of which is concentrated in their only ice-free unrestricted access to the open seas.⁵ Certainly any perceived threat to this armada would immediately involve the Nordic region, as any potential means of interdiction by NATO would be dealt with unhesitatingly by the Kremlin. Hence,

in the event of a conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, Northern Norway would have considerable importance. For the West at the very least, this area would be (and is) an important forward observation point. From the Soviet perspective, based on World War II experience, it can be viewed as a potential bridgehead for an offensive. And as mentioned above, the Soviets might feel obligated to take possession of this area in order to secure the access route to the Atlantic.⁶

Accepting the importance of this area for what it is, let us turn to an examination of the chronology of events which brought about Kekkonen's 1963 introductory proposal and the subsequent evolution of the policy as it became increasingly significant.

The origins of the concept of nuclear free zones (NFZ) lie not with the Finns, as is often surmised, but rather with the Poles, East Germans, Soviets and Swedes. The focus of attention was centered on the Baltic Sea. The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union made a joint call in June 1959 "to keep the Baltic Sea free of nuclear missiles and stationing of foreign troops."⁷ It was as a result of NATO maneuvers in this area in 1961, particularly West German participation, that the Kremlin voiced strong objections and sought to invoke the military cooperation clauses of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Finland. A similar proposal for Central Europe was raised in Poland by Adam Rapacki. Subsequently, in the fall of 1961, Swedish

Foreign Minister Oster Undin "put forward his idea of a 'non-nuclear club,' members of which would pledge themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons themselves or to receive such weapons on their territory on behalf of other powers."⁸

President Kekkonen's proposal of 28 May 1963 was actually the reenergizing of the Swedish proposal with some modifications, primarily the dropping of a linkage to an agreement on a nuclear test ban. In this, his first speech on the subject, Kekkonen pointed out that in fact the Scandinavian states already constituted a NFZ. What Finland sought to do was to consolidate the Scandinavian position which is made up of as many different approaches to security as there are countries. These approaches will be examined in detail concerning their impact on NFZ's.

In reviewing this relatively brief history of nuclear free zones one cannot ignore the motives inherent in making such proposals. Many point to Kekkonen's 1963 plan as yet another example of influence being exerted on the Finns by the Kremlin. In March 1975 Time went so far as to label Kekkonen the Kremlin's "errand boy" in Scandinavia.⁹ While this comparison may fit the guise of Finlandization, condemnation of Kekkonen's actions is not justified. The Finnish defense plan and the Scandinavian position in general do not support such a contention.

President Kekkonen proposed a Nordic NFZ with the conviction that it would "stabilize the position of the states

within the zone in some significant way."¹⁰ In an attempt to play an effective role in maintaining world peace, Kekkonen defined the small states' role as one in which they disassociate themselves from everything that is likely to increase tension."¹¹ Accusing the Finns of backing such a proposal, solely out of obedience to the direction of Moscow, would be akin to attributing American intentions in SALT II to the same motives. (Admittedly, a notion not totally void of subscription.)

Putting the expressed objective of the Finns in the context of their long term interests, it is clear that Kekkonen's plan is not a radical departure from their defense plan, but rather is in consonance with both Finnish and Scandinavian objectives as a whole.

With these early developments in the evolution of the current Finnish concept of NFZ's, let us turn to an examination of specific objectives of the policy. There are several arguments in favor of the proposal. First and foremost among these is the commonly accepted notion that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to security and world order. The comparison of the NFZ to the Non-Proliferation Treaty serves to underscore this fact. What would be encompassed in the Finns' NFZ proposal are five forms of proliferation prevention:

- a) manufacturing, testing and development of nuclear weapons;
- b) transfer of possession or control of nuclear weapons;
- c) stationing a nuclear power's own weapons in the zone area;
- d) nuclear weapon transit through the zone; and
- e) nuclear sharing...one state receives nuclear weapons 'on behalf' of another state.¹²

What arises here are the stark realities of the diverse routes that have been taken by the Nordic countries in pursuit of security. The "military base policy" of the NATO members, Denmark and Norway, meets the criteria of NFZ's in peacetime. This absence of nuclear weapons in this area in peacetime is not matched by guarantees of protection from being the target of nuclear weapons. Nor does the plan of the two NATO countries preclude introduction of offensive nuclear weapons in crisis situations.

The realities of geography largely dictate the need for this nuclear option for the Nordic NATO members. Contrasted with the sufficiently isolated nuclear free zone of Antarctica or Latin America, one gains an appreciation for the complexities injected into the equation when dealing with the increasing strategic significance of the northern flank in the East-West confrontation. Even in Latin America, difficulties have arisen primarily out of the proposed inclusion of large ocean area within the nuclear free zone, which the Soviets do not want off-limits to their nuclear missile submarines.¹³

This area was addressed in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco which formed a nuclear free Latin America, establishing a precedent of sorts.

The issue of nuclear free zones has been raised in the United Nations in conjunction with several initiatives as well. Finland capitalized on hosting the CSCE talks to draw attention to the issue. Some observers contend that the

source of this attention is derived as much from Moscow's decision to give support as from Helsinki's efforts.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet, N. V. Podgorny, in a major speech in Helsinki on 15 October 1974, said that Moscow was prepared, in conjunction with the other nuclear powers, to guarantee the status of a nuclear free zone in the north of Europe. This was reinforced by a telegram to President Kekkonen from Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin praising Finland for the importance and timeliness of its Pohjola NFZ proposal.¹⁴

The concept of guarantees that the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones would be respected became the focus of attention in 1975 when the issue of guarantees was limited to the structures of detente. The incumbent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Keijo Korhonen, primary sponsor of the action, summarizes his rationale as follows:

Nuclear weapons are a threat to the strong as well as to the weak, to the allied as well as to the neutral, to the developing and the developed alike. This is inherently recognized in the treaty (between the United States and the Soviet Union) where the parties undertake an obligation to conduct, not only their mutual relations, but also their relations with all other states, in a manner designed to exclude the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world. The parties also commit themselves, once again and as is their duty under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any threat or any use of force against any country.¹⁵

What has surfaced is the essential ingredient to fulfillment of the current preconditions of a Nordic NFZ: superpower guarantees. If, as Professor Aunonen suggests, a common Nordic approach to the problem has been found in a broad consensus which links the Nordic NFZ to the European continent, the primary obstacle then is the question of security guarantees by nuclear weapon holders for non-nuclear status of the Nordic

region.¹⁶ The wide range of interpretations of what form these guarantees must take makes it clear that this is a formidable stumbling block.

From the Swedish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anders Thunborg, the specific demands of Stockholm were voiced in 1975 as follows:

If the nuclear-weapon states support an agreement on such a zone - an important condition if it is to be of any value - the medium-range ballistic missiles and the tactical nuclear weapons (all except ICBM and SLBM) that are stationed near the zone and that could be directed against targets within the zone, will be superfluous, and the agreement should therefore provide for their withdrawal. This applies to land areas east and south of the zone and sea areas to the west and north.¹⁷

This essentially broadens the belt of security beyond the strict definition of the Nordic region into the Soviet Kola Peninsula, a stand which goes beyond any interpretation of current statements by Moscow. This "somewhat chiding observation by Sweden that the Soviet Northwest would logically be included are in sharp contrast to Finland's goal of reducing points of possible provocation."¹⁸

For NATO members, it is obvious that a fundamental shift in the attitude of the defense posture of Norway and Denmark would be required. Quite simply, the current situation does not lend itself to any optimism or even any positive motivation for such a dramatic change in approach to the national security by Norway and Denmark. The trend is actually in the opposite direction, as increased participation in NATO exercises is seen from its Scandinavian members.

The third period in this history of NFZ's commenced with the 8 May 1978 Stockholm speech by President Kekkonen. The address itself will be discussed with respect to the 9 May 1979 Hamburg speech, the most recent official expression on the Nordic NFZ. For purposes of discussion of this third phase, suffice it to say that in general terms, this new increased interest in said to stem from growing concern arising out of the instability caused by weapons technology, such as the cruise missile. "It is now necessary to ask whether the threat of instability is sufficient incentive for the NATO countries to negotiate and possibly abandon the military arms procurement advantages afforded by the new weapons technology."¹⁹

What overshadows this issue, of course, is the strategic balance of power in the whole Baltic area. The intensive buildup of forces by the Soviets in the Kola area makes even the goal of maintaining the status quo unrealistic.

Just prior to Kekkonen's recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, an arms control symposium was conducted in Helsinki out of which some of the views later voiced in the Hamburg speech became evident. Two members of the Finnish delegation participating in the Pugwash Symposium started with the assumption that: "the increasing strategic interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in the northern seas area makes the Finnish proposal for a Nordic NFZ more relevant today than ever before."²⁰ What then becomes obvious is that the focus of attention falls on Norway and whether

the nuclear option her NATO membership gives her is "conditio sine qua non for Norwegian security."²¹

Although the Norwegians may not face a serious nuclear threat themselves, "the main Norwegian scenario seems to depict a potential deployment of conventional forces from the Kola Peninsula against Northern Norway in a superpower conflict."²² The impetus for such an act of aggression by the Soviets would be either to secure the security of passage of their SLBM fleet into the Atlantic or to secure depth of security vis-a-vis the Kola Peninsula.²³ Against this sort of military threat, the nuclear option for Norway serves to raise the threshold against a local conventional attack, but "at the same time serves as a reassurance for the Norwegians of their political linkage to the wider European balance of power."²⁴

Unfortunately, the constraints on the use of force are not viewed with the same respect by all parties concerned. Despite Soviet assurances of support, the continued intensive buildup in the Kola Peninsula contradicts every reasonable expectation for achieving concessions from the Kremlin. While overt displays of enthusiastic support for the Finnish proposal are forthcoming, the persistent deliberate efforts to enhance not only the Kola area but Soviet forces in general cause these promises to ring hollow.

In his speech at the Ubersee-Club in Hamburg on 9 May 1979, President Kekkonen emphasized strongly the fact that

Finland is very much a European nation, something this author would interpret as underscoring the increasingly western orientation of the Finns. After indicating the importance of learning the lessons of history, Kekkonen conceded the need for international interdependence in security. With a passing mention of the military clauses of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and its attendant obligations, the significance of this statement is discounted with the pronouncement that the 1948 treaty "does not constitute a military pact."²⁵ The neutral position that the Finns maintain is predicated on this fact. In an attempt to impart a sense of urgency on the matter of establishing NFZ's and disarmament negotiations in particular, Kekkonen brought into the discussion that "new danger and uncertainty factors outside Europe have appeared on the horizon."²⁶ The potential impact this might have in Europe and the consequences for the Finns is viewed with apprehension.

A country in Finland's position cannot fail to fear an indirect deterioration of its security situation if the arms race in Europe accelerates and disarmament negotiations enter an impasse. Threatening signs of a development in this direction are perceptible.²⁷

All of this rhetoric can easily be dismissed if not viewed in the context of the comprehensive approach being pursued by Finland in her quest for security. Contrasted with the wording of the Stockholm speech, just one year earlier, one gains an appreciation for the distinct differences in Kekkonen's tone.

No comprehensive analysis of these two speeches has appeared to date. However, the initial reactions from various sectors of the Finnish bureaucracy are telling.²⁸ The opinions ranged from that of Professor Apunen who felt that the Hamburg speech made the necessary shifts in policy to encourage further dialogue, to the Chief of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Törnudd, who labeled any differences with the Stockholm speech as "superfluous."²⁹

Opinions from the military sector and the media noted "slight" shifts in policy. The head of the Press Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jaakko Bergqvist, offered a cautious but definite confirmation of the differences pointed out by Professor Apunen and labeled the Hamburg speech as a "new point of reference."³⁰ Discounting both the allegedly radical views of Apunen and the stoically reserved expression of Törnudd, the tempered opinion of Bergqvist surfaces as strikingly moderate, but at the same time thoroughly plausible.

Two conclusions are worth noting and are pertinent both within the context of the issue of NFZ's discussed in this thesis and the broader attendant issue of Finland's position in the world order.

First and foremost to the subject at hand, the resurgence of interest in arms control brought on by the success achieved in SALT II is reflected in the optimism voiced by Kekkonen at Hamburg. In addition, it has brought about an apparent compromise in the Finnish position providing increased efforts

at eliciting the commitments and guarantees from the Soviets and the United States which are prerequisites to formal establishment of a NFZ in the Nordic area. Realistically, the view expressed by Dr. Ruhala of the Finnish Institute of Military Science, which cites a continuing dialogue with maintenance of the statue quo as the current goals, seems to be the most solid appraisal.³¹

Secondly, the Finns have once again displayed that their external freedom of action has increased. Contradicting those who continue to misuse the Finns' name in defining the Kremlin's objective as Finlandization or domination of the West European people, Kekkonen's very action in this most recent gesture towards promoting detente and a NFZ serves to emphasize the autonomy enjoyed by the Finns.

Those who initially pointed to the Finnish ambitions as Soviet inspired should have gained by now an appreciation of the true source of the initiative and its objectives. Certainly it must be conceded that some of the results of a NFZ may coincide with what would appear to fulfill the ambitions of the Soviets. The balance of power would not be disrupted, however, and the comprehensive result of establishing a NFZ would lend stability to a potentially volatile area.

Credibility from the Soviet perspective is not entirely lacking. In an article on "The Northern Theatre," John Erickson specifically mentions the 1975 revival of the subject of NFZ's by the Soviets, commenting further that he does not

"take these manifestations to be mere idle political posturing or simple propagandistic manipulation."³²

What this passing commentary seems to reflect more than anything else is the unwillingness of Erickson and others to view the situation from the Scandinavian perspective. It is only in this context that one can credibly argue for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in this area and ignore the attendant problems which arise out of the intricacies and overlapping alliances of the great-power conflict. The majority of the points made in a 1973 article entitled "Problems of NFZ's"³³ remain valid today in spite of the conciliatory approach being taken by Kekkonen.

The only realistic goal that the Finns can anticipate is the continuing dialogue within the framework of on-going arms limitation talks. The divergent approaches the Nordic countries have taken towards national security remain far too incongruous to expect a regional alliance beyond what presently exists. The current trend of the NATO members is actually contrary to the establishment of the Nordic NFZ based on guarantees mentioned above. These guarantees may not be forthcoming from the superpowers and, as has been pointed out previously, would have a marginal impact or basis for credibility.

In the final analysis, there is precious little to support the prospects for creation of a Nordic NFZ as Kekkonen envisions it. The realities of the situation remain, however, and the status quo has been reasonably well maintained for

these past sixteen years. Certainly the position of the Finns has been enhanced with respect to increased autonomy. Whether Kekkonen's persistent pursuit of this security policy is the primary or even a major factor is impossible to ascertain without a better understanding of the Soviet perceptions which is not forthcoming.

While dramatic shifts in the structure of the Scandinavian defense system are not envisioned, neither is the erosion of Nordic independence in any quarter. If this is what being an "errand boy" for Moscow entails, it would seem reasonable to assume that Kekkonen will absorb any negative publicity in favor of continued gains in Finnish autonomy. Hence, one will see continued efforts toward achieving a Nordic NFZ with motives as varied as the possible results.

VII. CONCLUSION

Roger Berthoud warned about drawing "ponderous conclusions" about the Finnish communists.¹ As Chapter V attempted to explain and clarify, the historical background of Finnish communism is extremely complex.² Compounding the problem of sorting out the coalition politics of this unique form of participation by a communist party in a western style democracy is the inseparable issue of the relationship of the Finnish Communist Party and the Soviet Union. The dominating role this relationship plays must be kept in mind constantly to appreciate the delicate position of all Finns, not just those within the Finnish Communist Party. Certainly the knowledge that they have Moscow's blessing can be used to some advantage by the communists in coalition bargaining.

The approach taken by the Finnish communists has many unique qualities which make it difficult to compare it to other European communist movements in either Eastern or Western Europe. The single assured conclusion that one can make is that the Finnish communists have learned how to survive in politics within a democracy. As has been pointed out, unlike the relatively uncompromising nature of many other Eurocommunists, the Finnish communists appreciate the need to work within the system in order to promote their cause. Close ties to the Kremlin and the influence of geographical proximity

cannot be discounted, but evidence of Soviet involvement in the day-to-day politics of Finland is minimal.

Much has been learned from the Finnish experience in dealing with the great power, the USSR, and it is risky to take specific examples of the Finnish communists' behavior out of context. Even the Soviets have learned the necessity of having internal support in a country prior to attempting to establish a new government. The rejection of Kuusinen's government in 1940, discussed in Chapter V, had many causes, but the end result cannot be disputed: the Soviets failed to accomplish what they set out to do. Taken from another perspective, the Finns successfully resisted an attempt on the part of a conquering power to install a puppet government.

No one can predict the future of Finnish politics, although the historical precedent does seem to hold particularly true for Finland. This is especially evident if one accepts the proposition put forth earlier concerning the strong traditional voting patterns of the Finns. Furthermore, with a precedent of centuries versus decades, one must take account of the firmly rooted democratic ideals of these people both as Finns and as Scandinavians.

The results of the March 1979 elections are the most recent reflection of the extent to which the Finns have moved towards a role of independence from Soviet influence. The worst showing by the Communists since being recognized in 1945 is not solely an adverse reaction to Soviet media

influence, but rather the logical extension of what has been a deliberate and persistent move towards increased autonomy. Clearly, the economic factors cannot be discounted as unemployment nudges eight percent, but Conservative gains were disproportionately high (23%). To attribute these gains solely to any one cause would be oversimplifying the matter. Suffice it to say that perceptions of Soviet tolerance, combined with what Christian Science Monitor correspondent, Ron Sherer, described as a backlash against Soviet press warnings not to vote for the Conservative Party, both contributed to a setback for the left.³

Whether this trend will continue to expand the limits of Soviet acquiescence and increase the latitude of Finnish movement is difficult to confirm. The sharp contrast of the relatively calm after-effects of this election with the indignant and crisis-enhancing response to the 1961 election provides a firm indication of Finnish progress toward autonomy.

Can these conclusions be projected to the situations of other Eastern European countries? In general, these countries have already learned the lessons of submissive allegiance to the CPSU the hard way. Can they still be influenced by Finland's example?

Certainly there are many individual characteristics of each of the Warsaw Pact countries that could be pointed out as clearly distinguishing aspects of their bilateral interaction with the Kremlin. Likewise, the Soviets would be quick to

refute any stereo-type image of a dominated ring of buffer states on her western front. The wide range of approaches to ruling and party participation is in evidence from the way Tito ran Yugoslavia to Ulbricht's reign in the German Democratic Republic.

Similarly, Western European communist parties, or Euro-communists as they are called, display a diversity of platforms and exercise a wide variety of tactics in their quest for increased involvement in the affairs of state; especially, in Italy, France and Spain.

None of these countries has a population, economy or history that closely matches that of Finland, but there are some lessons of a general nature that the Finns have learned that seem to this author to be applicable to other Soviet neighbors.

First and foremost, the Finns understand the Soviet respect for force. This is the sort of precedent that is difficult to establish, but to gain a reputation as a fighter can go a long way at the bargaining table. Certainly it is a consideration in the Kremlin when the costs of intervention are weighed in contemplation of offering fraternal assistance. The Winter War experience, as pointed out in Chapter II, has considerable reason to remain fresh in the minds of the Soviets.

Secondly, the willingness to operate within mutually understood parameters of toleration has gotten the Finns repeated and consistent gains in many phases of interaction

with the Soviets. This predictable nature has contributed in large part toward building support for the third lesson: the effective use of force.

As expounded in Chapters IV and V, President Kekkonen's unique style of intimate diplomacy has built an aura rivaled only by the style that Tito displayed. The intangible nature of personal trust as a factor must not be discounted. It has and will continue to play a major role in Finnish foreign policy as well as domestic politics.

The example of Russo-Finnish relations as a model for other nations to follow in dealing with a great power so as to avoid domination has many limitations as brought out earlier. Nevertheless, the principles followed by the Finns in successfully pursuing their current policy of active neutrality are applicable to the industrialized countries. The role of toleration by the Soviets in holding up Finland as the example of how two countries can cooperate cannot be discounted. This author feels, however, that the Finns have successfully played their politics to evolve from a subjugated, defeated nation in 1944 to an effective member of the international community. To summarize the historical relationship brought out in detail in Chapter II, from her initial conquered status after World War II, Finland has progressed to a stance of autonomous neutrality. There can be little doubt that Finland's position has become one that is increasingly independent with respect to the Kremlin.

By putting the priority on foreign policy, domestic considerations in Finland have suffered somewhat. But at least this attention to foreign affairs has met with a large measure of success in gaining a favorable position on the international scene. Kekkonen, as primary agent of Finnish foreign policy, has effectively played the Soviets' goals to his country's advantage. He has the trust of the Kremlin and appreciates the strength of his position as both a popular leader of the Finnish people and an effective player on the international scene.

It does not seem that it would be going too far to say that Kekkonen has taken advantage of the Soviets, holding up his country as an example of Russian cooperation with a democracy. Finnish leaders appreciate the need of the Soviets to maintain good relations with them, and are capable of operating very effectively within the boundaries of Soviet toleration. The position of Finland improves as her economic ties to the European Economic Community and other non-Communist nations enhance the strength of the economy with the exception of energy.

The positive impact of the economy is felt in other sectors of Finnish society as well. Stability in internal politics is closely tied to the economy as party lines are aligned largely according to profession. The shift back to the center away from the Communist coalition in the March 1979 Parliamentary elections must serve as the most recent indicator. On

the basis of these favorable notes for Kekkonen's policies, the necessary support to stabilize the sagging economy should be forthcoming.

In a 1976 report of the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee, Finland's own perception of the effects of her security policy were expressed as far-reaching:

The opportunity for small countries to influence international policies have grown in the 1970's. The increase in the contacts and forms of cooperation between nations has at the same time posed a challenge, especially to the foreign policy of neutral countries. By virtue of its neutral position Finland has participated actively in international cooperation...⁴

Finland has been a positive influence and will be an increasingly positive force as Kekkonen's policy of active neutrality achieves greater autonomy for the Finns. The Finns are not the only ones confronted with a dilemma; the Soviets face an equally formidable quandry in Scandinavia:

The Soviet dilemma inheres in the fact that an exploitation of the opportunity to induce Norway and Denmark to drift away from NATO by acquiescing in or encouraging the formation of a Scandinavian bloc, would involve the unacceptable risk of Sweden, and, particularly, Finland, drifting in a westward direction.⁵

The road that Finland is being led down by President Kekkonen is in as safe and as effective a direction as our ideals of western democracy could hope for. We should respect the delicate balance that the Finns maintain and help them most by not interfering. Or, as George Kennan put it, "we can help them only by giving them our respect for their

remarkable accomplishments as a people, and our understanding for their unique and delicate geographic situation."⁶

In attempting to define Finlandization it has become clear that the term has been maligned to the point of almost escaping definition. It has been this author's contention that the essence of the term Finlandization is embodied in the question posed by President John F. Kennedy in the following excerpt from an article by H. Peter Krosby:

All of the basic Western assumptions regarding Soviet intentions and Finland's unenviable situation were implicit in President John F. Kennedy's revealing question, ... 'what puzzles us Americans is why the Soviet Union has allowed Finland to retain her independence?'

Those who feared detente would pave the way for the extension of Soviet influence "saw Finland as an example of a country already remotely controlled from Moscow and held it up as a warning to the rest of Western Europe."⁸ On the contrary, the Finns hardly provide the best example of a European country that has become Sovietized, if that is what Finlandization represents.

What should be increasingly apparent from the evidence presented is that there is a disparity between the negative connotations involved in the term Finlandization and the reality of the Finnish position. If one dwells on the current level of involvement by the Soviet Union in Finnish affairs, a case could be made for a somewhat vague structure of influence being exerted. When taken in the context of comparing

Finland's position today vis-a-vis 1944, Soviet involvement has obviously diminished to an almost insignificant level.

In his address in Hamburg on 9 May 1979, President Kekkonen pointed out some of the unique aspects of Finnish history which contribute to this dramatic evolution of a country in such a short period of time. In spite of coming out on the losing side of both the Winter War and the Continuation War, Helsinki stood as one of only three European capitals not occupied, the other two being Moscow and London.

Having maintained this status to the present day, at the very least the Finns must be credited with a policy that has precluded the physical presence of the Soviets. It could be argued that Finnish neutrality is self-imposed and from the Soviet point of view it is "cheap since it spares the outsider [the USSR] the need to invest time, money and effort in stage-managing the transformation and keeping the new spirit alive and functioning properly."⁹

It is the conclusion of this thesis that the Finns are very much aware of the Soviets pragmatic approach to their relationship with Finland, and they have exploited it in a very successful manner.

There is an element of risk inherent in making a research trip of any sort, particularly if the researcher has completed the majority of his reading on the subject before embarking. While this was the situation in the pursuit of investigating this thesis, a conscious attempt to maintain objectivity was

made, the success of which is left to the reader to judge. Hopefully any evidence offered from interviews did not appear prejudiced as that secured by an author travelling in search of only supporting material. Those individuals who generously shared their time and opinions were considerate enough to provide a diverse spectrum of viewpoints from various sectors of the Finnish government and media. The prevailing impression gained was one of the great pride harbored by the people of Finland. Certainly they have their share of problems and are aware of them. The overwhelming majority of people this author came in contact with, however, from the thoroughly professional tour guides to university professors and government officials, were justly proud of their heritage and current position in world politics. The disproportionately significant role that is played by this small nation testifies to the strength of will of the people. Whether or not this thesis convinces you of the measure of autonomy the Finns have achieved or the importance of Finland's role in international politics, the sincerity and pride of the Finnish people toward this end is apparent to any who care to look. Anything less is a consequence of this writer's failure to effectively communicate.

APPENDIX A

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS SIGNED ON APRIL 6, 1948

ARTICLE 1

In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obligations as an independent state, fight to repel the attack. Finland will in such cases use all its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present Agreement and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with, the Soviet Union.

In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union will give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 is present.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their intention loyally to participate in all measures towards the maintenance of international peace and security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations Organization.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties confirm their pledge, given under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 10th February 1947, not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 5

The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their decision to act in a spirit of co-operation and friendship towards the further development of consolidation of economic and cultural relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.

ARTICLE 6

The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to observe the principles of the mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and that of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State.

ARTICLE 7

The execution of the Present Agreement shall take place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Organization.

ARTICLE 8

The present Agreement shall be ratified and remains in force ten years after the date of its coming into force. The Agreement shall come into force upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification, the exchange taking place in the shortest possible time in Helsinki.

Provided neither of the High Contracting Parties denounces it one year before the expiration of the said ten-year period the Agreement shall remain in force for subsequent five-year periods until either High Contracting Party one year before the expiration of such five-year period in writing notifies its intention of terminating the validity of the Agreement.

In witness hereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in the city of Moscow on the sixth day of April 1948 in two copies, in the Finnish and the Russian languages, both texts being authentic.

MAUNO PEKKALA

V. MOLOTOV

APPENDIX B

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE IN 1975 AND 1976 AND THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSAL

FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURE IN 1977-1981

(Military defense: Budget Bill reference No. 160)

ITEM	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total 1977-81	Share in total expenditures
Wage bill	510	524	530	535	535	540	545	2685	31%
Maintenance of national servicemen and special expenditure on training	210	185	210	220	225	235	245	1135	13%
Basic procurements and renewals	270	276	340	400	465	535	560	2300	26%
Operating and mainten- ance expenditure	225	190	250	270	290	310	320	1440	16%
Real estate and other Defense Forces Expenditure	285	222	230	235	235	240	245	1285	14%
TOTAL	1500	1397	1560	1660	1750	1860	1915	8745	100%

1) At fixed prices at the price and wage level of January 1976

2) Balance sheet for 1975

3) State Budget for 1976

APPENDIX C

YEAR	PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE	SEATS (out of 200)
1945	23.5	49
1948	20.0	38
1951	21.6	43
1954	21.6	43
1958	23.2	50
1962	22.0	47
1966	21.2	41

APPENDIX D

PARTY	NUMBER OF SEATS OUT OF 200							
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1951</u>
Social Democratic Party	54	55	52	55	38	48	54	53
Peoples' Democratic League	40	37	36	41	47	50	43	43
Center Party	39	35	36	50	53	48	53	51
Conservative Party	35	34	37	26	32	29	24	28
Swedish Peoples' Party	10	10	12	12	14	14	13	15
Liberal Party	9	7	8	8	13	8	13	10
Christian League	9	4	1	-	-	-	-	-
Rural Party	2	18	18	1	-	-	-	-
Others	2	-	-	7	3	3	-	-

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CHAPTER VII - FOOTNOTES

¹"In Finland, the Mixed Attitudes to Giving Power to Communists," The Times, 28 April 1976, p. 14.

²Ibid.

³"Finns Boost Conservatives Despite Moscow's Glare," Christian Science Monitor, 21 March 1979, p. 4.

⁴Report of the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee, By Jan-Magnus Jansson, Chairman (Helsinki: Painorauma, 1977), p. 19.

⁵Johan Jorgen Holst, ed., Five Roads to Nordic Security (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p.4.

⁶George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 145.

⁷H. Peter Krosby, "Finland and Détente: Self-interest Politics and Western Reactions," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1978 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1979), p. 40.

⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁹George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1978), p. 11.

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